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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3(j) (Supp. 1990).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the District Court correct when it ruled that

Thiokol did not affirmatively represent that soil conditions at
the Project Site would be the same as the conditions shown in the
boring logs presented with the specifications where (a) all
information provided was accurate; (b) the logs were accompanied
by a map clearly showing they were obtained from another site
over 1,400 feet from the Project Site; and (c) the logs were presented with a specific disclaimer that they were not a part of
the contract and were provided for information only.
2.

Was the District Court correct when it ruled that

Frontier did not reasonably rely on the boring logs as a representation of conditions at the Project Site when (a) Frontier did
not believe the boring logs were a representation that conditions
at the Project Site would be identical to the subsurface conditions indicated at the boring location; (b) Frontier knew that
the logs were obtained from another site over 1,400 feet from the
Project Site; (c) the boring logs were accompanied by a specific
disclaimer; and (d) Frontier understood that the conditions it
actually encountered were likely to be present in the vicinity of
the Project Site.

3,

If Frontier is now attempting to appeal the dis-

missal of the defamation claim, is it entitled to do so when it
did not raise that issue in its docketing statement?

If so, did

the District Court correctly grant Thiokol's motion for summary
judgment on that issue where the communication was an opinion
which was protected by the privilege between Thiokol and Layton
and was made without malice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing an appeal from an order granting or denying summary judgment, the Court of Appeals accords no deference
to the trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.

CECO v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969

(Utah 1989).

The Court of Appeals construes the facts in the

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Lucky

Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988).

This

is the standard applicable to issues one and two and the second
part of issue three.

In applying this standard, the appellate

court will consider whether Frontier and Layton adduced sufficient evidence to support as a matter of law the essential
elements of their differing site conditions and defamation
claims.

See Reeves v. Geiqy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636,

642 (Utah App. 1988); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (on summary
judgment, the party opposing the motion has the burden of coming
-2-

forward with evidence in support of every essential element of
its claim).
The first part of issue three arises from Frontier/
Layton's failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

It should be resolved in favor of Thiokol based on the

application of that rule.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 9(c)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires the docketing statement to include:
The issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the
terms and circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary detail . . . For each issue appellant must
state the applicable standard of appellate review and
cite supporting authority.

-3-

STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by Frontier and Layton (collectively
"Frontier/Layton") from the order of the Honorable Franklin L.
Gunnell of the First District Court for Box Elder County, State
of Utah:
1.

Granting Thiokol's Motion for Summary Judgment; and

2.

Denying Frontier/Layton's Motion for Partial Sum-

mary Judgment.
Frontier was a subcontractor to Layton on the Thiokol
M-193 Trident Two Casting Complex (the "Project11).

Thiokol owned

the Project and Layton was the general contractor.

Frontier

sought additional compensation from Layton under the subcontract
alleging that it encountered subsurface conditions different from
those represented in the contract specifications.

Layton denied

liability to Frontier but nevertheless cross-claimed against
Thiokol asserting that Thiokol is liable to Layton under the general contract for any amount Layton is required to pay Frontier
based on a differing site conditions claim.

Frontier also

asserted a defamation claim against Thiokol and Jody Wood, a
Thiokol employee.
Frontier subsequently settled with Layton and acquired
Layton's claims against Thiokol. On cross motions for summary

-4-

judgment, the district court ruled in favor of Thiokol, dismissing the action in its entirety with prejudice.
STATEMENT OP UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following undisputed facts were presented to the
court below on the issues now on appeal:
1.

Thiokol and Layton executed a Purchase

Order/Contract ("Purchase Order") dated July 17, 1986 which
included specifications ("Specifications") for the construction
of the Project.
2.

(R. 472-479).

The Purchase Order incorporates Thiokolfs standard

terms for fixed price construction contracts, Form TC-7761
("Standard Terms"), which in turn incorporates certain Federal
Acquisition Regulations ("FAR") by reference.

(R. 480-484).

The

Purchase Order, Specifications, Standard Terms and'FAR will be
collectively referred to as the "General Contract."

The relevant

provisions of the Purchase Order, Specifications, Standard Terms,
and FAR regulations are reproduced in full in Addendum "A."

They

may be summarized as follows:
a. The terms of the General Contract are binding
on all subcontractors as well as the general contractor.
Purchase Order at 1117.0. (R. 478-479).
b. A claim for differing site conditions arises
only if conditions represented in the contract are materially different from conditions actually encountered or are
unusual and cause an increase in the contractor's cost or
time required for performance. FAR S 52.236-2(A). (R.
543).
-5-

c. The contractor shall make every effort to
familiarize himself with prevailing work conditions and is
not relieved from responsibility for performing work without
additional cost to Thiokol by his failure to do so. Specifications, General Requirements at HI.11; FAR S 52.236-3.
(R. 544).
d. Prior to starting work, the contractor will
become familiar with site conditions concerning excavation,
filling and grading. Specifications, Excavation, Filling
and Grading at 3.01(A). (R. 545).
e. A copy of a log of soil borings from another
building site over 1,400 feet away is included with the
specifications. Specifications, Subsurface Investigations
at 1.01(A), (B). (R. 545).
f. The Specifications state explicitly that the
boring logs are provided for the contractor's information
only and are not a warrant of subsurface conditions. Specifications at 1.01(C). (R. 545).
g. Thiokol assumes no responsibility for the contractor's conclusions or interpretations of the information
provided by Thiokol. FAR S 52.236-3(D). (R. 544).
h. The contractor is not relieved from performing
details omitted from the specifications or drawings. Standard Terms at H16. (R. 543).
3.

On August 7, 1986, Frontier and Layton entered into

a Subcontract Agreement pursuant to which Frontier agreed to perform part of the Shoring and other portions of the General Contract at the fixed price of one hundred sixty thousand one hundred dollars ($160,100.00).
4.

(R. 31-32).

There was no contract between Thiokol and Frontier.

(R. 279-297).

-6-

5.

Jeong S. Liu ("Liu"), Vice President and Office

Manager of Frontier, prepared Frontier's bid on the subcontract
work on the Project.

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 26). Liu has a

B.S. degree in civil engineering, a masters degree in soil
mechanics and a Ph.D. in structural engineering.

(R. 123, Liu

Depo. I at 34). The field of soil mechanics deals with the composition, density, grain size and mechanical properties of soil.
(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 15).
6.

Before bidding for the subcontract work on the

Project, Frontier previously had worked on five other Thiokol
projects in the Salt Lake Valley in Box Elder County west of
Brigham City, including the M-191 site and M-301 buildings.

(R.

123, Liu Depo. I at 9-12, 17-19; R. 133, Liu Depo. II at 70).
7.

The Project is located in the northern part of the

Salt Lake Valley near an old creek bed (the "Project Site").

(R.

123, Liu Depo. I at 16-17, 20; R. 119, Larsen Depo. at 7 ) . The
majority of the soils in the Salt Lake Valley are lacusterine
deposits, or deposits formed by an ancient lake.

(R. 123, Liu

Depo. I at 15-16, 39). Lacusterine deposits are composed of different sized particles from silt to gravel and boulders.

(R.

123, Liu Depo. I at 15-16, 39). Lacusterine deposits modified by
alluvial deposits are typical near old creek beds.
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Alluvial

deposits are left by the force of flowing water and consist of
sand, gravels, cobbles and clay.
8.

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 16).

It is not unusual for subsurface soil conditions to

change radically within a distance of 10 feet.

(R. 125, McLean

Depo. at 24). Soil conditions typically differ from location to
location.

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 18).
9.

The General Contract contained no indications of

subsurface soil conditions at the Project Site.

Although two

boring logs were provided with the Specifications, those logs
came from the M-191 site, 1400 feet south of the Project Site and
the Specifications clearly identified that fact.
at SS 02010, 02010/2.
10.

Specifications

(R. 665-666).- 7

The same section of the Specifications which pre-

sented the boring logs contained this disclaimer:
The soil report was obtained only for the engineer's
use in the design and is not a part of the contract
documents. The log of borings is provided for contractor's information but is not a warrant of subsurface
conditions.
11.

Before bidding on the Project, Frontier's repre-

sentative knew the boring logs included in the Specifications
were not taken from the Project Site, that the Project Site was
close to an old creek bed, that gravels and cobbles were likely

1/

Copies of the boring logs and map are attached to this Brief
as Addendum "B."
-8-

in the soils found in the vicinity of the Project, particularly
in areas near old creek beds, and that extensive cobbles and
boulders were encountered at another nearby Thiokol site despite
boring logs to the contrary,

(R. 133, Liu Depo. II at 57, 71; R.

123, Liu Depo. I at 19-20; R. 125, McLean Depo. at 27-28).
12.

Frontier did not interpret the boring logs as a

representation that subsurface conditions at the Project Site
would be identical to conditions at the site from which the logs
were taken.
13.

(R.123, Liu Depo. I at 28).
Frontier did not inspect the Project Site prior to

the preparation of its bid.
14.

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at

20).

The Shoring portion of the General Contract

2/
required Frontier to drive steel sheet piles into the earth.Frontier encountered difficulty driving the sheet piles immediately after starting work August 7, 1986.

2/

(R. 125, McLean Depo.

The Shoring portion of the General Contract provided for
construction of two casting pits at either end of the Cast
Cure Building. It required driving interlocked steel sheet
piles about 49 feet into the earth to form two steel frames
approximately 23'4" square. See Specifications at §02400
(R. 546); see also photograph illustrating the pile-driving
procedure. (R. 549). The earth was later excavated from
the frame, bracing installed, and a concrete lining poured
so that the end product was a square cement-lined hole in
the ground with the pilings as the outside form for the concrete walls. See Specifications at S02400 (R. 546); see
also photograph depicting the pile-lined enclosure after
excavation and prior to pouring the cement lining. (R. 550).
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at 36, 40). The piles were driving out of plumb and were distorting and bending below the surface.

(R. 125, McLean Depo. at

40-41).
15.

Frontier encountered intermittent layers of gravel

between 6 to 30 inches thick on some piles at varying depths.
(R. 125, McLean Depo. at 82-83); see also photographs which show
the gravel "lenses" encountered in various areas.
16.

(R. 551-555).

Frontier now asserts that its problems with the

pile driving were caused by "not being able to move around the
gravels in the stiff clay zone."
17.

(R. 125, McLean Depo. at 78).

On August 28, 1986, Frontier asserted that it had

encountered differing site conditions.

(R. 134, Exhibits to Liu

Depo. I, at Exhibit 6 ) . On August 29, 1986, Layton denied that
there were differing site conditions and suggested that Frontier's problems were due to its improper procedures and equipment.

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 55; R. 134, Liu Depo Exhibits at

Exhibit 6(A)).
18.

Layton did not assert a differing site conditions

claim against Thiokol until Frontier sued Layton.
190-192).

(R. 184,

Subsequently, Layton and Frontier settled and Frontier

acquired Layton1s claim against Thiokol.
5.

-10-

See Appellants Brief at

FACTS CONCERNING DEFAMATION ISSUE
The defamation issue is not properly before this Court,
Nevertheless, the undisputed facts relevant to that issue are as
follows:
19.

On August 28, 1986, representatives of Thiokol,

Layton and Frontier met at the Project Site in response to Frontier's claim that it had run into gravels and cobbles. Jody Wood
of Thiokol was present at that investigation and did not see cobbles or gravels in the drilling spoils he was shown during that
visit.

(R. 120, Wood Dep. at 45-48).
20.

On September 2, 1986, representatives of Thiokol,

Layton and Frontier again met at and inspected the site. Gravel
was found in the drilling spoils at that time.

(R. 125, McLean

Depo. at 68).
21.

No work was done at the site between the August 28

and September 2 site inspections.

(R. 125, McLean Depo. at

65-66; R. 134, Liu Depo. Exhibits at Exhibit 28).
22.

In a letter to Layton dated September 9, 1986,

Wood, who was responsible for administration of the General Contract, stated "the fact that gravel suddenly appeared [during the
second site inspection] would tend to conclude that the site may
have been seeded." (R. 134, Liu Depo. Exhibits at Exhibits 19,
i
28; R. 120,^ Wood Depo. at 67-69; R. 468-470).
-11-

23.

Jody Wood wrote the September 9 letter in response

to Frontier's claim for additional compensation.

(R. 468).

When

he wrote that letter, Wood sincerely believed it was possible
that gravel had been added to the drilling spoils.

(R. 469).

Wood was acting to protect Thiokol's interest in avoiding
non-meritorious claims for extra compensation and had no other
explanation for the sudden appearance of the gravel when no work
was done at the Project Site between the two investigations.
469-470).

(R.

The letter was directed to Layton because Layton was

responsible for Frontier's performance, and because Layton would
have been the party to bring any claim against Thiokol for extra
compensation.
tier.

(R. 469-470).

Wood bore no malice toward Fron-

(R. 469-470).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court correctly ruled that Thiokol did not

make an affirmative representation of subsurface conditions at
the Project Site.

The presentation of accurate boring logs from

a location over 1,400 feet from the Project Site, accompanied by
a specific disclaimer that the logs were provided for information
only and were not a warrant of subsurface conditions, is not such
a representation.
The District Court also ruled correctly that Frontier
could not have reasonably relied on the boring logs as a
-12-

representation of subsurface soil conditions at the Project Site.
Frontier knew that the logs were inherently unreliable as an
indication of conditions at the Project Site.

Frontier's repre-

sentative, Julian Liu, admitted that he did not rely on the logs
as a representation that conditions would be identical at the
Project Site.

Liu had extensive education and experience with

conditions in the Project area. The specific disclaimer accompanying the logs warned Frontier not to rely on the logs as a warrant of conditions at the Project Site.
Finally, if Frontier is now attempting to appeal the
defamation issue, it waived that appeal by its failure to include
the defamation claim in its docketing statement. Moreover, the
District Court correctly granted Thiokol's motion with respect to
the defamation claim because the statement in question was the
expression of an opinion rather than a statement of fact. Furthermore, it was a privileged communication based on a business
relationship and no malice was shown.
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
The General Contract between Layton and Thiokol con-

tains the differing site conditions clause incorporated from the
Federal Acquisition Regulations. That clause allows a differing
site conditions claim by appellants only if conditions
-13-

encountered were materially different from conditions represented
in the General Contract (a,"FAR Type I" claim) or if conditions
were "unusual," (a "FAR Type II" claim) and those conditions
caused an increase in Frontier's costs or time for performance.
Frontier/Layton assert only a Type I claim.
Case law construing the differing site condition clause
of FAR establishes six elements of a FAR Type I claim, each of
which must be met by a claimant before recovery is permitted.
Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of two essential elements
in the district court sufficient to overcome Thiokol's motion for
summary judgment.
II.

Thus, the summary judgment must be affirmed.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THIOKOL DID NOT
MAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE REPRESENTATION OF SITE CONDITIONS.
A.

The Elements of a FAR Type I Claim Require The
Contractor to Show An Affirmative Representation
of Sub-Surface Conditions At The Project Site.

The general contract between Thiokol and Layton incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulations, Sections 52:236-2 and 3.
See Addendum "A."

These provisions have never been interpreted

by a Utah appellate court. They have been interpreted, however,
by many federal court decisions.

Those federal cases are the

only guide, and therefore the best guide, as to the effect to be
given to these provisions.
In Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v U.S. 13 CI. Ct.
193, 218 (1987), aff'd. 861, F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the U.S.
-14-

Claims Court considered a FAR Type I claim and laid out the elements necessary to establish such a .claim.

They are:

1. The contract documents must have affirmatively represented the subsurface conditions that form the basis of
the contractor's claim;
2. The contractor must have acted reasonably in interpreting the contract documents;
3. The contract indications must have induced reasonable reliance by the contractor that the subsurface conditions were more favorable than those actually encountered;
4. The subsurface conditions must have materially differed from the subsurface conditions indicated in the
contract;
5. The actual subsurface conditions must have been
reasonably unforeseeable; and
6. The contractor must show its claimed excess costs
were solely attributable to the materially different subsurface conditions within the contract site.
The claimant in Weeks contracted to dredge many miles of canal.
The government furnished the contractor 156 boring logs, most of
which were taken from the banks, rather than from the channel to
be dredged.

The claimant sought an adjustment because it claimed

that the volume of particular types of materials actually encoun3/
tered exceeded the volume indicated by the boring logs.As

±'

The contract documents indicated a gross volume of material
to be dredged. Each boring log indicated types of materials
and thickneses of each such material. The claimant argued
that the compilation and (in effect) averaging of these
material thicknesses was a representation of the total of

Footnote continued on next page.
-15-

the Federal Circuit said in disposing of this claim, "the contract did not affirmatively indicate the specific quantities of
the various subsurface materials but only indicated the types of
subsurface materials and the total volume of all materials to be
removed."

Weeks, Nos. 88-1044, 88-1070 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 2, 1988)

(Westlaw, Allfeds Database).

Thus, the first element of a dif-

fering site conditions claim, that the contract documents must
affirmatively represent the subsurface conditions at the site,
was not established.

As long as the information supplied is

accurate, the conclusions drawn by the contractor from that
information are at his own risk.

Weeks, 13 CI. Ct. at 221-223;

see also, P.J. Maffei Bldq. Wrecking Corp. v. U.S., 732 F.2d 913
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
Similarly, Frontier/Layton failed to show that Thiokol
supplied any inaccurate information or made any material representation of subsurface conditions at the Project Site.

All

Frontier/Layton have shown is that Thiokol furnished what limited
information it had, boring logs from another site over 1,400 feet

Footnote continued from previous page.
each of type of material that would be encountered at the
site. As the Claims Court noted, this contention failed to
take into account that many of the boring logs were from off
the site. Additionally, the claimant failed to show that
what was found at any given point could be expected to be
found for any given distance around that point. 13 CI. Ct.
at 221-223.
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distant.

Any conclusion drawn by appellants from that informa-

tion was at their own risk.

"A contractor cannot be eligible for

an equitable adjustment for changed conditions unless the contract indicated what those conditions would supposedly be."
Maffei, 732 F.2d at 916.-^
B.

Thiokol's Specific Disclaimers Regarding Non-site
Information Preclude the Finding of a
Representat ion.

An owner who specifically disclaims the accuracy of
non-site information cannot be said to have made a representation
of the site conditions.

For example, in Maffei , the out-of-date

structural drawings referred to in the specifications were coupled with a disclaimer that the information was furnished "for
information only," that it "not be part of the contract documents" and that it was "not guaranteed."

Maffei, 732 F.2d at

917.
The undisputed facts presented to the trial court
showed not only that Thiokol made no representations of conditions at the Project Site, but that it warned that the non-site
information provided should not be relied upon as a warrant of

The elements under the Utah cases of Jack B. Parson Constr.
Co. v. State, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah 1986) and Thorn Constr. Co.
v. Dept. of Transp., 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) are essentially the same, and they include a requirement of a misleading assertion of site conditions.
-17-

conditions at the Project Site.

When Thiokol furnished the

off-site boring logsf they were coupled with warnings and disclaimers (1) that the contractor had the duty of becoming familiar with site conditions, (2) that the boring logs were from
another site 1400 feet distant, (3) that they were not part of
the contract documents, (4) that the logs were for information
only, and (5) that they were not a warrant of subsurface
conditions.
The facts of this case bring it squarely within the
holding of Maffei.
(Cal. 1967).

See also, Wunderlich v. State. 423 P.2d 545

Frontier/Layton are precluded by the specific dis-

claimers in the Specifications from prevailing on their claim.
Summary judgment for Thiokol was required by reason of these
undisputed facts.
C.

Appellants' Argument That Thiokol Cannot Disclaim
Fails to Take Into Account The Nature of Thiokol's
Specific Disclaimer,

Appellants urge that the disclaimers in the General
Contract are ineffective.

Appellants' Brief at 27.

They fail to

recognize a crucial distinction made by the case law between general and specific disclaimers.
Information provided by the owner vhat is non-specific
to the contract site, accompanied by specific warnings or

-18-

disclaimers, will be enforced.

In contrast, general disclaimers

of site-specific representations will be disregarded.
The first part of this rule is exemplified by Maffei.
The second is illustrated by Hollerbach v. United States, 233
U.S. 165, 34 S. Ct. 553, 58 L. Ed. 898 (1914), a case relied on
by appellants.

The distinction between the two parts of the rule

is neatly explained in P.T. & L. Const, v. Dept. of Transp., 108
N.J. 539, 531 A.2d 1330, 1335-42 (N.J. 1987).
To sum up, when the State actually makes
false representations in its contract documents
that are more than gratuitous and amount to positive averments of site conditions, it will remain
liable to the public contractor despite a general
exculpatory clause in the contract. * * * Inferential conclusions from contract documents, however, shall not be considered a false factual representation in the face of sufficiently clear and
unambiguous disclaimers of liability by the State.
531 A.2d at 1342.

Compare, Wunderlich v. State, 423 P.2d 545,

548-50 (Cal. 1967) (court gave effect to the specific disclaimer
where there was no positive assertion of site conditions), with
E.H. Morrill Co. v. State, 428 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1967) (specific
representation not overcome by a general disclaimer).
This principle was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court
in L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co. v. Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034 (Utah
1978).

The court in Young discussed Wunderlich extensively and

adopted the Wunderlich rationale to deny the contractor recovery.
In Youngf the paving contractor for an airport runway claimed it
-19-

had relied on information the owner had provided concerning soil
conditions and the water table at the project site in calculating
its bid.

The contract contained a specific disclaimer concerning

soil or material borings or tests. Id. at 1039. The court ruled
that when there is no misrepresentation of the facts or withholding of material information and there is a disclaimer pertinent
to the information presented, the contractor cannot justifiably
rely on that information as a warranty of conditions.

Id.

at

1038-39.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Thiokol made no
site-specific representations, that the information it provided
was general.

Layton/Frontier were specifically warned not to

rely on this information as a positive representation of site
conditions.

Thiokol's specific warning and specific disclaimers

that were coupled with this general information precludes any
argument that Thiokol made a representation of conditions at the
Project Site. Maffei, Wunderlich, and Young, are all directly
applicable.

The district court's ruling that no representation

of site conditions was made must be affirmed.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT FRONTIER DID
NOT REASONABLY RELY ON THE BORING LOGS.
As an independent basis for granting summary judgment,
the district court found that Frontier/Layton could not demonstrate that they reasonably relied on the boring logs.
-20-

Under

Weeks, as well as the state law cases of Parson and Thorn, reasonable reliance upon the alleged representation is an essential
element of a differing site conditions claim.

The undisputed

facts of this case, however, including Frontier's admissions,
preclude any showing that Frontier's reliance upon the boring
logs was reasonable.
To begin with, the contract documents specifically
alerted Frontier that the boring logs were from a distant site by
including a map showing the exact location of the other site in
relation to the Project Site, along with the boring logs.

In

addition, the same section of the Specifications which presented
the boring logs specifically stated that "the log of borings is
provided for the contractors information but is not a warrant of
subsurface conditions."

These undisputed facts alone are suffi-

cient to support the trial court's ruling that Frontier could not
have reasonably relied on the boring logs as an accurate representation of conditions at the Project Site.
The lower court's ruling is further reinforced by
admissions that Frontier made in depositions.

First, Frontier

admitted that it knew before preparing its bid that the boring
logs came from the distant site.

In fact, Frontier had worked at

the other site a few years earlier.

Frontier knew that soil con-

ditions in the area of the Project site could change radically
-21-

within just a few feet.

Frontier also was aware that because the

Project was adjacent to a stream bed, the gravels, cobbles and,
other conditions complained of were typical and could be expected
to occur.

Julian Liu's deposition testimony on that point was

particularly illuminating:
Q. I take it from what you say that where there
have been streambeds, you might find a mixture of clays,
sands and gravels?
A.

(Liu) Correct.

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I. at 17).

Q. Did you know that it [the Project] was adjacent to a creek bed?
A.

Yes, I do.

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 20).

Q. Mr. Liu, . . . given the location of Building
M-193 [the Project], was it or was it not unusual to find
gravel there?
A.

It was not unusual.

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 21-22).
In a "supplemental11 comment to that answer, Liu then
stated:
When you ask whether its unusual to run into
gravels and cobbles, I answered yes in a sense
that there's [a] creek there, there is hills surrounding the site. Anybody with geotechnical
training wouldn't say no, you will not run into
gravels and cobbles.
-22-

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 22-23).
Frontier's most damaging admissions undermine the very
theory of its case.

For example, Peter McLean of Frontier admit-

ted he knew that the boring logs were inherently unreliable as an
indication of conditions at the Project Site because they were
taken from another site 1400 feet distant:
Q. And so when Irv Perkins pointed it out to you,
you realized then, I take it, that the soil boring was over
a thousand feet from this job?
A.

Exactly.

Q. And I think earlier you testified that soil
can change radically within even 10 feet; is that right?
A.

Exactly.

Q. And so you then realized when you were told
where the boring was that you didn't know what the soil conditions were at the job site itself; is that correct?
A. Soils vary so much that, yeah, it could be —
it could be different at that point. It could be surmising
things and working what you see, you're working blind; so
therefore you surmise other problems when you're in soils if
you don't have a recollection of the soils that's right then
and there, you know, in that zone area.
Q. Are you saying that you shouldn't rely on a
soils report unless it's at the very location where you're
going to be doing the pile driving?
A.

Yes, I'd say that.

(R. 125, McLean Depo. at 27-28).
Even more damaging was Julian Liu's admission that
Frontier did not interpret the logs as a representation that
-23-

conditions at the Project Site would be identical to conditions
at the site from which the borings were taken:
Q. (By Mr. Patten) Now, Mr. Liu, is it your
claim in this lawsuit that Morton-Thiokol or Layton represented to you that the soils at M-193 (the Project Site)
would be identical to the soils in the borings taken over a
thousand feet away?
A. We bid our job according to the information,
the soil boring logs, M-191 (the other site). There's no
further information furnished to us; therefore, we based our
claim on that. Also, the engineer has based his design on
that; otherwise, he wouldn't have chosen the sheet pile
scheme.
Q. Now I want
question is do you claim
resented to you that the
thousand feet away would
Site)?
A.

you to answer my question, and my
that Morton-Thiokol or Layton repsoil borings of a location over a
be identical to M-193 (the Project .

No.

(parentheticals added)

(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 27-28).

Ample authority exists for entering summary judgment on
the issue of reasonable reliance, given the undisputed facts of
this case and the nature of Frontier's admissions.

For example,

Pacific Alaska Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 436 F.2d 461,
469 (Ct. CI. 1971) demonstrates that if contract documents do not
indicate conditions at the site, a contractor cannot reasonably
rely upon the contract documents as a representation of site conditions.

In that case, the contractor claimed to have inter-

preted the contract documents as indicating that no additional
fill would be required for an embankment (i.e. that the job would
-24-

be "balanced").

In granting summary judgment to the government,

the court determined that the contract documents were silent on
that question and that the contractor's interpretations "are more
realistically seen as hopes, expectations, guesses, or suggestions than as firm indications that subsurface or latent conditions were such that balance would actually be achieved."

436

F.2d at 470.
While not controlling, the Utah Supreme Courtfs decision in Young, 575 P.2d at 1038-1039, establishes a similar
point".

The Utah court held that a contractor could not justifi-

ably rely on non-specific information as a warranty of site conditions in the face of a specific disclaimer coupled to the
information presented.

On a similar note, Weeks, 13 CI. Ct. at

225, recognizes that the farther away the borings are from the
contract site, the longer the extrapolations, and the greater the
likelihood of inaccurate predictions.
In the present case, Frontier unjustifiably assumed
that it could rely on the boring logs from the M-191 site as an
accurate depiction of subsurface conditions at the Project Site.
The contract documents warned against such an inference.
tier knew better than to place such reliance on the logs.

FronNever-

theless, Frontier turned a blind eye to the contract documents
and to its own extensive knowledge of local soil conditions.
-25-

It

now tries to pass to Thiokol the blame for the consequences of
its own unreasonable actions. However, the legal authorities and
sound policy are squarely contrary to Frontier's arguments.
Thiokol was entitled to summary judgment below and that judgment
should be affirmed.
IV.

FRONTIER/LAYTONfS FAILURE TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE OF TWO
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THEIR CLAIM ENTITLES THIOKOL TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On summary judgment, Frontier/Layton had the burden of

coming forward with evidence in support of every contested element of that claim.

Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764

P.2d 636, 642 (Utah App. 1988); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); see also Weeks
Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. U.S., 13 CI. Ct. 193, 218 (1987),
aff'd. 861 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

In the court below, appel-

lants produced no evidence to support their burden of proof on
two of those necessary elements —

(1) that Thiokol made a repre-

sentation about conditions at the Project Site and (2) that
Frontier/Layton reasonably relied upon what information Thiokol
did furnish.
Frontier/Layton's failure to present evidence to support the representation and reliance elements is faial to their
claim.

Accordingly, the lower court's ruling granting summary

judgment in favor of Thiokol must be affirmed.
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V.

THIOKOL AND JODY WOOD ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON FRONTIER'S DEFAMATION CLAIM.
A.

Frontier Has Waived its Right to Appeal the
District Court Ruling on Frontier's Defamation
Claim.

Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires appellants' docketing statement to state:
The issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the
terms and circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary detail . . . For each issue appellant must
state the applicable standard of appellate review and
cite supporting authority.
Appellant's docketing statement dated as of February 6, 1990 does
not list the defamation issue. There is absolutely no indication
in the docketing statement that Frontier/Layton intended to
5/
appeal the court's ruling on Frontier's defamation claim.Their failure to even mention that claim in the docketing statement precludes the assertion of the defamation claim on appeal.
B.

The District Court Ruling Granting Summary
Judgment on the Defamation Claim Must Be Affirmed.

In any event, summary judgment on the defamation claim
in favor of Thiokol must be affirmed.

The undisputed facts dem-

onstrate no defamatory statement was made, or alternatively, that
Thiokol was privileged to make the statement.

£/

Similarly, appellants did not refer to the defamation claim
in their Motion for Summary Disposition filed February 15,
1990 pursuant to Rule 10.
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The allegedly defamatory material was in a September 9,
1986, letter from Jody Wood of Thiokol to Layton.
Depo. I at 86, 121).

(R. 123, Liu

In that letter, Wood wrote:

The fact that gravel suddenly appeared would
tend to conclude that the site may have been
seeded.
This communication does not meet the first element of a defamation claim—a false and defamatory statement concerning another.
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 559 (1977); Berry v. Moench, 8
Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814, 820 (1958).

It was not a defamatory

statement, but Wood's opinion given to explain the sudden appearance of gravel in the spoils at the Project Site.

See, Restate-

ment (Second) of Torts S 556 (1977); see also Oqden Bus Lines v.
KLS, Inc.. 551 P.2d 222, 225 (1976) (right of media to voice
opinion).

The communication

was based solely on the fact that

McLean was unable to produce any gravels when Wood inspected the
Project on August 28, yet when the site was inspected on September 2, there was gravel found in the spoils even though no work
had been done in the interim between the inspections.
Whether a statement constitutes fact or opinion is a
question of law, not a question of fact as urged by
Frontier/Layton.

Held v. Pokornyy 583 F. Supp. 1038, 1039

(S.D.N.Y. 1984).

The words used were cast as an opinion by Wood.

He said, "the fact . . . would tend to conclude."
-28-

As an

expression of Wood's opinion, the defamation claim fails as a
matter of law under the Celotex standard.
In addition, Wood's statement was privileged.

The ele-

ments of a conditional privilege have been enumerated by the Utah
Supreme Court as "good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and
publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only."
Knight v. Patterson, 20 Utah 2d 242, 436 P.2d 801, 802 (1968);
Sowell v. IML Freight, 30 Utah 2d 446; 519 P.2d 884, 885 (1974).
Communications between persons who share a common business interest are entitled to a qualified privilege and are not "libelous
in the absence of malice."

Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278

(Utah 1983).
Thiokol and Layton share a common business interest.
At the time Wood's letter was written, Frontier claimed it was
having difficulty because of subsurface gravel even though no
gravel had been shown on the initial inspection.

Thiokol and

Layton were assessing the legitimacy of that claim which threatened both Thiokol's and Layton's pecuniary interests.

Wood's

communication was limited to this purpose and was published only
to Layton, which at the time shared Thiokol's purpose.
Privilege makes the publication non-actionable unless
the privilege is abused or malice proved.
-29-

Knight, 436 P.2d at

803.

The record contains no evidence of malice.

Since Frontier

has the burden of affirmatively showing malice when the conditional privilege exists, the defamation claim fails as a matter
of law.

Knight, 436 P.2d 803 n.2; see also Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L.Ed 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986)
(plaintiff's burden is to submit significant probative evidence
to support a reasonable jury finding that plaintiff has shown
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Thiokol respectfully submits
that the ruling of the First District Court granting summary
judgment in favor of Thiokol must be affirmed.

Thiokol did not

make an affirmative representation of subsurface conditions at
the Project Site by presentation of accurate information about
boring logs from another site accompanied by a specific disclaimer.

Moreover, Frontier could not and did not reasonably

rely on the boring logs as a representation that conditions at
the Project Site would be identical to the conditions indicated
at the boring location.

Appellants are precluded from appealing

the defamation claim by their failure to include it in the docketing statement, and cannot prevail on that claim since Wood's
communication was his opinion given in a privileged context and
without malice.
-30-
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ADDENDUM "A"
PURCHASE ORDER/CONTRACT;
1.0

All work under this contact shall be completed in
strict accordance with Morton Thiokol specifications
137-86, Addendums 1, 2, 3, and all drawings as called
out in the Specifications and Addendums.

4.0

For and in consideration of the satisfactory
performance of this contract, Morton Thiokol shall pay
the contractor the total sum of two million eight
hundred and sixty-two thousand dollars ($2,862,000.00).

8.0

No "Cost Bearing" changes in either the specifications
or the drawings, including deletions or additions,
shall be made without prior approval of the Morton
Thiokol resident engineer and Morton Thiokol Buyer.
Approval must be obtained in writing. In case of "Cost
Bearing" changes, contractor will be required to
furnish complete cost breakdown information.

14.0 Morton Thiokol terms and conditions for fixed price
construction contracts, Form TC 7761 (Rev. 5-86) and TC
Form 7798 (Rev. 5-86) are incorporated herein by
reference and shall apply to this contract as though
fully set forth herein.
17.0 The provisions of this contract shall be binding on all
subcontractors as well as the contractor. It is the
contractor's responsibility to inform subcontractors of
the contract provisions.
STANDARD TERMS. FORM TC 7761:
Form TC 7761 is incorporated into the General Contract by 11 14.0
as noted above and provides in relevant part:
16. Scope of Work. Omissions from the drawings
or specifications, or the misdescription of details of
work which are manifestly necessary to carry out the
intent of the drawings or specifications, or which are
customarily performed, shall not relieve the Contractor
from performing such omitted or misdescribed details of
work, but they shall be performed as if fully and
clearly set forth and described in the drawings and
specifications. Such omitted or misdescribed work

supplied by the Contractor shall be without cost to
Morton Thiokol, but any changes in drawings or
specifications directed by Morton Thiokol shall be made
in accordance with the clause hereof entitled
"Changes."
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION PROVISIONS:
Form TC 7761 in turn incorporates certain clauses of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") including 52.236-2 and 3 which
provide as follows:
Section 52.236-2
Differing Site Conditions (Apr. 1984)
A. The contractor shall promptly, and before the
conditions are disturbed, give a written notice to [Thiokol]
of:
1. subsurface or latent physical conditions
at the site which differ materially from those
indicated in this contract, or
2. unknown physical conditions at the site,
of any unusual nature, which differ materially
from those ordinarily encountered and generally
recognized as inhering in the work of the
character provided for in the contract.
B. [Thiokol] shall investigate the site conditions
promptly after receiving the notice. If the conditions do
(materially so differ) and cause an increase or decrease in
the contractor's cost of, or the time required for,
performing any part of the work under this contract, whether
or not changed as a result of the conditions, an equitable
adjustment shall be made under this clause and the contract
modified in writing accordingly.
C. No request by the contractor for an equitable
adjustment to the contract under this clause shall be
allowed, unless the contractor has given the written notice
required; provided, that the time prescribed in A. above for
giving written notice may be extended by [Thiokol].
D. No request by the contractor for an equitable
adjustment to the contract for differing site conditions
shall be allowed if made after final payment under this
contract.
Section 52.236-3 Site
Investigations and Conditions Affecting the Work (Apr. 1984).
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. . . The contractor . . . acknowledges that it has
satisfied itself as to the character, quality, and quantity
of surface and subsurface materials or obstacles to be
encountered from an inspection of the site, including all
exploratory work done by [Thiokol] as well as from the
drawings and specifications made a part of this contract.
Any failure of the contractor to take the actions described
and acknowledged in this paragraph will not relieve the
contractor from responsibility for estimating properly the
difficulty and cost of successfully performing the work, or
for proceeding to successfully perform the work without
additional expense to [Thiokol].
D. [Thiokol] assumes no responsibility for any
conclusions or interpretations made by the contractor based
on the information made available by [Thiokol]. Nor does
[Thiokol] assume responsibility for any understanding
reached or representation made concerning conditions which
can affect the work by any of its officers or agents before
the execution of this contract, unless that understanding or
representation is expressly stated in this contract.
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS;
The specifications are incorporated into the General Contract by
11.0 as noted above and include the following material
provisions:
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
1.11

SITE INSPECTION

The Contractor shall make every effort to
familiarize himself with the prevailing work
conditions. Any failure by the contractor to do so
shall not relieve him from the responsibility of
performing the work without additional cost to Morton
Thiokol.
SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATIONS
1.01

DESCRIPTION

A. Soil borings of the representative area
near the building site have been taken by Chen and
Associates, Salt Lake City, Utah.
B.
1/

A copy of the boring logs is included.!/

Copies of this section of the Specifications, the map and
the boring logs are attached to this Brief as Addendum "B."
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C. The soil report was obtained only for the
engineer's use in the design and is not a part of the
contract documents. The log of borings is provided for
contractor's information but is not a warrant of
subsurface conditions.
EXCAVATION, FILLING, AND GRADING
3.01

General

A. Familiarization: Prior to all work of
this section, the Contractor will become thoroughly
familiar with the site, the site conditions, and all
portions of the work falling within this [Excavations,
Filling and Grading] section.
SECTION 02400
SHORING
1.02

Description of Work

B. Shoring and bracing shall be provided for
the construction of the casting pits, with sheet piling
to remain as the back form for the concrete pit walls.
1.04

Qualifications

Shoring operations shall be performed by a
firm with experience in pile driving on similar
completed projects.
2.01

Shapes

A. Steel sheet piles and special fabricated
shapes shall be of a design that assures continuous
interlock throughout the entire length when in place.
3.01

Shoring and Bracing

. . .

C. Interlocking steel sheet piling, driven
prior to the excavation effort, shall be used to shore
the casting pits. Piling shall be driven to such
tolerances as required to maintain the minimum pit wall
dimensions.
dhb:112790a
-4-

ADDENDUM " B "
SECTION 02010
SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATIONS
PART 1 - GENERAL
1.01

1.02

DESCRIPTION
A.

Soil borings of a representative area near the building site
have been taken by Chen & Associates, Salt Lake City, UT.

B.

A copy of the boring logs is included.

C.

The
the
log
not

soils report was obtained only for the Engineers use in
design and is not a part of the Contract Documents. The
of borings is provided for Contractors1 information but is
a warrant of subsurface conditions.

QUALITY ASSURANCE
A Soil Engineer may be obtained by Morton Thiokol to observe
performance of work in connection with excavating, filling, and
grading. Readjust all work performed that does not meet technical
or design requirements but make no deviations from the Contract
Documents without specific and written approval of the Engineer.

02010

LOCATION 07 EXPLORATORY HOLES
Approxinate Scale
1" • *«»•
02010/2

chen and associates, inc.
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C l a y , (CL), s e d i u a s t i f f * t o v e r y s t i f f ,
s e a t o dark gt r et ry .

slightly soiet to so l e t ,

D

Clsy end s i l t , , atllfehtly sandy t o sandy, <CL-KL), l n t e r l a y e r e d ,
s t i f f t o very s t i f f , s l i g h t l y s o i e t t o very s o i e t , l i g h t t o dark

P

Qndlstssbed D r i v e fieapl*. The s y a b o l 1 0 / 1 2 i n d i c a t e s t h a t 10 bloi
o f s 1*»0 pound h e a v e r f a l l i n g 30 i n c h e s v e r s r e q u i r e d t o d r i v e tl
s a a p l e r 12 i n c h e s .

NOTES:
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Test holes were drilled on January 20, 1982, with a 7-inch dlanet
hellow steal auger.

(2)

Elevetions ere approximate and were taken froa contours on plan
provided.

(5)

No free water was encountered in the test holes at the tise of
drilling.

(4)

WC DD •
-200
LL «
PI •
QC *

Water Content (*)t
Dry Deneity (pcf);
«= Percent Passing No. 200 Sieve;
Uquid Unit (*);
Plesticity Index (*);
Ohconfined Coapressive Strength (psf).

83/10
wc*19.0
Du= 1 0 ^ . 1
-200=99
LL=«»1
PI=2«»
OC=ll|,100
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